This paper applies the methodology developed by Forte and Peña (2006) to extract the implied default point in the premium on credit default swaps (CDS). As well as considering a more extensive international sample of corporations (96 US, European and Japanese companies) and a longer time interval (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004), we make two significant contributions to the original methodology. First, we calibrate bankruptcy costs, allowing for the adjustment of the mean recovery rate of each sector to its historical average. Second, and drawing on the sample of default point indicators for each company-year obtained, we propose an econometric model for these indicators that excludes any reference to the credit derivatives market. With this model it is thus possible to estimate the default barrier resorting solely to the equity market. Compared with other alternatives for setting the default point in the absence of CDS (such as the optimal default point for shareholders, the default point in the Moody's-KMV model or the face value of the debt), the out-of-sample use of the econometric model significantly improves the capacity of the structural model proposed by Forte and Peña (2006) to differentiate between companies with an investment grade rating (CDS less than 150 bp) and those with a non-investment grade rating.
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Introduction
A central element in structural credit risk models is the definition of a stochastic process for the total value of the company's assets, and the assumption that default arises when its value reaches a specific minimal threshold. This threshold is usually referred to as the default barrier or the default point 1 .
The empirical testing of these models usually involves analysing their capacity to generate credit risk premia that are consistent with those observed in other markets such as the debt market. Such testing is normally hampered by the fact that a good number of the parameters common to most structural models are not directly observable. This is the case, for instance, of the volatility of the total value of assets, of the potential costs of bankruptcy, and of the default point 2 . As a result, researchers need to define a procedure for estimating the parameters, which ultimately means testing turns into a simultaneous test on the model and on the estimation procedure.
In a recent paper, Forte and Peña (2006) (FP hereafter) propose a structural model consisting of a modified version of the well-known model of Leland and Toft (1996) .
One distinguishing aspect of the FP paper is that, along with the model, it proposes a specific procedure for determining the parameters. The methodology proposed (theoretical model and estimation procedure) has two fundamental characteristics. Firstly, it considers that bankruptcy costs may be assumed to be equal to zero when valuing the company's total assets, although such costs are clearly relevant with a view to valuing debt. The reason lies in the fact that such costs do not affect the total value of the assets, solely the percentage of assets that will remain in creditors' hands in the event of bankruptcy. In this respect, FP adopt an approach similar to that proposed by Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) .
The second key aspect is the termination of the default point. FP propose calibrating this parameter on the basis of the information available in other markets, particularly in the CDS market. This procedure is analogous to determining the volatility of shares on the basis of the price of their associated options.
FP demonstrate that the methodology described allows, for most companies, for the generation of credit risk premia drawing on stock market capitalisation and an a small number of accounting items, which would be in line with those observed in the bond or CDS markets.
In this way the authors are able to analyse, on the basis of a uniform measure such as the credit risk premium, the different speed with which the three markets (for bonds, CDS and equities) incorporate new information in respect of credit risk. FP conclude that the equity market leads the other markets when it comes to incorporating this information, with no clear pattern of leadership between the bond and CDS markets.
One limitation of the procedure proposed by FP is that it is not applicable to companies without CDS or reasonably liquid bonds, and it is precisely in these cases when the information that can be generated from the equity market will prove more valuable.
1. The possibility of default is restricted on occasions to specific periods. In the seminal paper by Merton (1974) , for example, default can only take place on maturity of the debt. It is moreover habitual in this type of model to speak interchangeably about default and bankruptcy, although both events need not be associated. This interchangeability will also be applicable in this paper. 2. Although the default point is not observable, many models provide a guide to determine it. This is the case, for instance, of models with an endogenous default point.
In this paper we analyse the determination of the default point when the only market information available is that provided by the equity market. To do this we consider a broader international sample of companies than in FP (96 US, European and Japanese companies), and one which spans a longer period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . We apply the methodology described to the sample with a view to obtaining the default point indicator (the ratio between the default barrier and the face value of the total debt) for each company-year observation.
One fundamental contribution compared with the paper by FP is that instead of considering exogenous bankruptcy costs like these authors, such costs are calibrated on the basis of the sector in question. The aim is that once the process to estimate the default point indicators is over, not only will the premia observed in the CDS market be replicated, but an expected recovery rate will be obtained for each sector adjusted to the historical evidence.
The main conclusion from applying this procedure is that the bankruptcy costs would on average be around 60% of the value of the company's assets, far above what is traditionally assumed by the literature 3 . In the wake of these results, these costs should be broadly interpreted and include, in addition to legal costs, the loss of future income incurred by the company owing to the potential discontinuation of operations.
Based on the series of premia in the equity market and in the CDS market,
we perform an analysis of price discovery to provide further evidence on this process.
In line with the results obtained by FP, we find that the equity market leads the CDS market in the incorporation of new information on credit risk. This conclusion is valid for all the periods The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the FP methodology.
Section 3 analyses the sample of companies and implementation of the procedure described in Section 2. Section 4 studies the process of price discovery. Section 5 develops the econometric model, while Section 7 tests its usefulness with a view to a potential out-of-sample application. Finally, Section 8 draws the main conclusions. The Forte and Peña (2006) Methodology
The FP methodology is essentially a modification of the Leland and Toft (1996) model, as well as a procedure for estimating the default barrier based on information on the credit risk premium in markets other than the equity market, and in particular in the CDS market.
The original Leland and Toft (1996) model has as its premise that the total value of the company's assets, V, moves according to the following continuous diffusion process
where µ and σ represent the expected return of V and its volatility, respectively, δ the proportion of the total value of the assets set aside for payment to investors (interest and dividends), and z describes a standard Brownian process. Under these assumptions, Leland and Toft (1996) show that the value at any point in time t of a bond with a maturity τ , principal ( ) τ p , coupon ( ) τ c , and whose holder receives a fraction ( ) τ ρ of the value of the assets in the event of default, will be given by the following expression
where r is the risk-free rate and B V the default barrier. The expressions ( ) τ F and ( ) τ G will in turn be given by
On the basis of equation (2), FP suggest expressing the default point B V as a fraction β of the face value of the total debt P. Assuming then that each creditor receives, in the event of default, a fraction of that value (net of bankruptcy costs) proportionate to the weight of the face value of their debt relative to the total debt, that gives the following alternative expression for the value of the bond 4 
Another fundamental equation in the FP methodology is that which relates the value of own capital, ( )
, to the value of the firm's total assets
represents the value of the debt under the assumption that the bankruptcy costs are equal to zero. The intuition whereby α does not form part of the equation defining ( )
, although it does affect the valuation of the debt in keeping with expressions (3) and (4), is based on the fact that the shareholders will not be directly affected by the firm's loss of value in the event of bankruptcy, since the creditors are the only parties that bear this cost 5 .
Calibration procedure
The credit risk premium provided by the structural model at each point in time t is determined as the theoretical premium of issuing a bond at par with a maturity equal to that of the CDS that are to be used subsequently for the calibration of β , and which we will assume to be equal to 5 years. Specifically, this bond should pay a coupon such that the following condition
If we denote this coupon as ( ) 4. See also Leland (2004) . 5. For a discussion of this point see Forte and Peña (2006) . whereupon the premium obtained on the basis of the structural model will respond to the differential between this yield and the risk-free rate
To apply this procedure it is necessary to have at each point in time t information on: FP propose considering volatility, bankruptcy costs and the default point indicator as constant, and allowing the rest of the variables to depend on t. In order to determine these variables, the following data will firstly be collected:
D1. Daily data on stock market capitalisation.
As we will see below, the estimation of the total value of the assets based on stock market capitalisation in keeping with expression (5), is the key factor that allows the information provided by the equity market in terms of credit risk premia to be translated. These accounting data will typically be available quarterly, half-yearly or annually, whereby some type of interpolation is proposed in order to translate them into daily data.
Total liabilities (TL) will be the sum of short-and long-term liabilities. That gives The payout t δ shall be expressed as
Having thus assumed a value for β , the series of the total value of the assets t V can be estimated, as can volatility σ , by means of the following algorithm 1) Proposing an initial value for σ , 0 σ .
2) Taking as a basis the observed stock market capitalisation series, St, estimating the series Vt so that the relationship expressed in (5) holds for all t.
3) Estimating the volatility of t V , 1 σ , on the basis of the series obtained in 2).
4) Concluding whether
Otherwise proposing 1 σ in step 1 and repeating until convergence.
However, this procedure calls for the total value of the debt to be determined when bankruptcy costs are zero, ( )
. On the basis of equation (4), and imposing 0 = α , it is possible to express this value as the sum of individual bonds. It therefore becomes necessary to interpret the information available on the debt (short-and long-term liabilities, and interest payments) in the form of such bonds. FP suggest considering that the company maintains a total of ten; one with the face value of the short-term debt and with a maturity equal to one year, and nine with a maturity of 2 to 10 years respectively, and a face value for each one equal to 1/9 of the long-term debt. Furthermore, a coupon is assigned to each of these 10 bonds, representing a fraction of the annual payment of interests proportionate to the weight of the face value of the bond relative to the face value of the total debt.
The risk-free interest rate to be applied to each of these bonds will be the swap rate corresponding to their maturity. The following information will thus have to be reflected: whereby the sole parameter to be determined is β .
The following relationship between the series ICS and CDS is then assumed . Under these conditions the Mean Squared Error is
and β is finally determined as that value of the default point indicator which minimises this measure of discrepancy between series, i.e.
( )
In sum, the implied credit risk premium in the equity market is constructed on the basis of (6). The necessary arguments, detailed in I.1.-I.7., are estimated using the data described in D.1.-D.3. and equations (6)-(13). Data and Implementation
A. Data
The initial sample contains daily data on five-year CDS for 120 non-financial corporations in the United States (dollar-denominated CDS), Europe (belonging to the euro area and with euro-denominated CDS) and Japan (yen-denominated CDS). The data have been taken from CreditTrade, and are confined to the period from 2 January 2001 to 31 December 2004.
For the equity market, daily data on stock market capitalisation are obtained from Datastream. Taken from this database, also with a daily frequency, is the 1-10 year swap rate in dollars, euro and yen. The accounting items required by the FP methodology (short-and long-term liabilities, along with interest and dividend payments) are obtained from WorldScope.
B. Implementation
The general procedure described in Section 2 is specified in our case as follows: A total of 7 companies are eliminated in accordance with the restrictions imposed in point 2, either because of a lack of sufficient data on CDS or because of the absence of the related data for the equity market.
FP indicate moreover that it is not advisable to apply their methodology to companies involved in mergers or acquisitions, and they analyse the specific example of the merger of Olivetti and Telecom Italia. The reason is that as the merger or acquisition draws near, the credit premiums for these companies will tend increasingly to represent the credit risk of the joint company, with the information on one of the companies involved proving insufficient in this case 6 . The following point of the implementation is intended to eliminate those companies subject to merger or acquisition processes that may have a significant bearing on results:
3. For each company a study is made of whether, during the sample period, merger or acquisition operations are under way 7 . If they are, the company is eliminated if such an operation entails an amount higher than 5% of the total value of its assets, and if it gives rise to a change in its capitalisation of more than 10%.
6. The development of an adjustment allowing this methodology to be used on the consolidated theoretical company is, moreover, beyond the objectives of this study. 7. To identify merger and acquisition operations we have used the SDC Platinum database, which was made available to us thanks to Ricardo Gimeno.
This procedure involves eliminating another 6 companies from the sample 8 .
For the companies that remain in the sample after step 3, an initial estimation (E1A) is
made assuming a constant β for each company throughout the period,
FP indicate that on this point it is possible to obtain two solutions: one with a "small" β and one with a "large" β . They justify the first solution as being more reasonable, since the second one means values of β typically above 1, which does not generally appear rational from the standpoint of the shareholders 9 . To ensure that the first solution is obtained, and adhering once again to FP, the following procedure is applied: a) Choose an initial, sufficiently small value for
β (specifically 0.3), and
c) If 8. We should acknowledge that such a procedure does not prevent the possibility of certain companies affected by mergers or acquisitions from continuing in the sample, owing to the fact that completion of the operation may have come about subsequently to our sample period. Foreseeably, however, such a possibility will not significantly influence the results. 9. We may add that it is not consistent either with the empirical evidence on recovery rates. one of those pairs allows, moreover, a specific credit risk premium to be replicated. Indeed, this premium depends on the RR and on the (risk-neutral) probability of default. Having set an objective RR drawing on the empirical evidence, there will only be one pair of values for α and β that additionally allow the CDS and ICS series to be adjusted.
Taking
Assuming β equal to 0.731, Leland (2004) manages to replicate the expected default frequencies (EDF) of different credit ratings. This, combined with bankruptcy costs of 30%, enables an RR of around 51% to be reproduced at the same time. FP likewise assume bankruptcy costs of 30%. For their sample, the calibration of β gives rise to an average value of 0.792, and therefore to an average RR of 55%. Significantly, both papers arrive at very similar estimated values departing from different approaches. One seeks to replicate EDF and the other premiums in the CDS market. Both Leland (2004) and FP consider that an RR slightly higher than 50% is reasonable given the historical evidence.
An RR of around 50% need not, however, be the most appropriate reference value for any sector or any period. (2004)]. The higher percentage of these costs might therefore be associated with the loss due to transfer of future income, such transfers being made more or less free of charge by the company to other firms in its sector, on deciding to discontinue operations.
In the case of companies whose activity is linked to specific tangible assets, as is the case with gas corporations, this free transfer will be minor, as any company wishing to take up the market share freed up by a bankrupt company will possibly have to purchase from that company a portion of its tangible assets. In the case of other types of sectors whose activity is linked to a lesser extent to specific assets, as is the case with telecoms, the transfer of income will be sizeable, since the companies in this sector may assume the market share freed up without compensating in any way the bankrupt company.
It thus seems reasonable to introduce sectoral variability into the bankruptcy costs.
To this end, the β estimation procedure in respect of that proposed by FP is extended as follows: FP offer examples to argue that an "abnormally high" MSE may be indicative of the presence in the CDS of information other than the credit risk associated with the company's financial position. It is important to strip out these companies before calculating the average RR by sector owing to the potential bias that they might add to these averages.
Up to 11 companies are eliminated for this reason.
In the light of the results of point 6, a selection is made in each sector of a representative
firm as far as the RR is concerned, namely the firm whose RR is closest to the average obtained for its sector following the EIA estimation. The specification is then made of the bankruptcy costs it is necessary to assume so that the company, once a fresh estimation of 04 01− β has been made, may generate an RR equal to the historical average for its sector.
The use of a representative company allows, for each possible value of α , The results of steps 6 to 8 are shown in Table II . Panel A reflects the results of assuming bankruptcy costs of 30% for all companies. Evidently, this leads to the systematic overestimation of the RR for all sectors, which would appear to indicate that such costs will be higher in all cases than the assumed figure of 30%. This is duly indicated by the results of steps 7 and 8 contained in panel B. The panel reflects how the method applied enables an RR by sector consistent with the empirical evidence to be generated, albeit at the expense of assuming bankruptcy costs far above those traditionally accepted by the literature 11 . The most evident case in this respect is that of the telecoms sector, with estimated bankruptcy costs of 69%. It is however difficult to reconcile bankruptcy costs of between 10% and 20% [as estimated by Andrade and Kaplan (1998)], or even of 30% [as assumed by Leland (2004) and FP], with a loss given default (LDP) of 77% (alternatively, an RR of 23%). Bankruptcy costs of 30% would be consistent with an RR of 23% if a value for β equal to 0.33 were assumed, i.e. if telecoms were capable on average of withstanding the total value of their assets being equal to 33% of the face value of their debt, without defaulting on the payment of such debt. The average value of β obtained for these companies is, however, 0.74. Continuing with the previous arguments, we have it that both the combination ( 3 0. = α ; 33 0. = β ) and the combination resulting from the estimation 10. Our classification matches the FTSE/JSE Global Classification System. With these groupings, therefore, we consider an equivalence between the ten sectors of this classification and those included in Table I . 11. In all cases the MSE remains below 1 after the E2B estimate. 74 0. = β ) allow an envisaged average RR for this sector of close to 23%, but only the second combination gives rise, moreover, to credit risk premiums for the equity market consistent with those observed in the CDS market.
C. The Final Sample
As a result of the procedure described, the following data are obtained for a final sample of Table IV contains the various measures of the differential between the ICS and CDS series habitually used in the literature. This differential is shown to be greater in absolute-value terms (avab) the worse the rating is, but highly stable in relative terms [avab(%)]. Both results would be consistent with a log-linear relationship between the series in keeping with expression (11). The inverse relationship between credit rating and differential in absolute-value terms may moreover explain very well the results in terms of years and economic areas. Thus, the improvement in credit rating in our sample during the period 2002-2004 (represented by the decline in CDS) was accompanied by a reduction in this differential. Likewise, we find that the United States, the area with the biggest levels of CDS, is also the region with the biggest differentials in absolute terms. At the other extreme would be Japan, with the lowest levels of CDS and the lowest differentials. Generally, the discrepancy between series appears in our case greater than that obtained by FP (28.66% on average in relative terms for the entire sample, compared with 18.79% in the aforementioned study). It should however be recalled that, in their study, FP adjust the value of β on a half-yearly basis, while in our case this adjustment is made on a yearly basis. Evidently, the greater the frequency with which β is estimated, the better the adjustment will be. For a non-negligible number of companies/year, the default point indicator is higher than one, something which FP indicate is not in principle rational from the standpoint of the shareholders. These authors consider that a CDS β higher than 1 may be indicative of the fact that the CDS used in the calibration contain components such as cheapest-to-deliver options. Indeed, if the CDS represent an upwardly biased estimate of the credit risk premium in this market, that will translate into a likewise upwardly biased CDS β . Possibly, however, a CDS β higher than 1 is reflecting the presence of factors external to the will of the shareholders when determining the default point (as would be the case of potential liquidity problems). In this respect, the results are consistent with other papers. Davydenko (2005) finds, for example, that for 90% of the companies in default in his sample, the ratio of the market value of the assets to the book value of debt is in the interval (0.27,1.23), very much in line with the content of Fig. 1 . Price Discovery
In their study, FP evaluate the different speed with which the bond market, the CDS market and the equity market incorporate fresh information on credit risk. One fundamental conclusion of this paper is that the equity market leads in this respect the CDS (and bond) markets. Although a price discovery analysis of this type is not among the central objectives of this study, the availability of a bigger set of companies for a longer period, on one hand, and the modifications proposed for the estimation of the 
where the optimal number of lags is determined following the Schwarz criterion. The Granger causality test finally helps identify which market incorporates earliest the fresh information in relation to credit risk. The results in Table V confirm the FP conclusion in that the equity market leads the CDS market. The table further indicates that this is true for all the periods and economic areas considered.
12. Clearly, and compared with the paper by Forte and Peña (2006) , our analysis is partly limited by not having information on the bond market. It would not seem, however, that this could significantly affect the conclusions on the price discovery process between the CDS market and the equity market. 13. In the case of CDS ICS series, and for the sake of clarity, we omit the sub-index CDS.
An Econometric Model for β : In their study, FP find that volatility is a key factor when explaining differences in the default point between companies (up to 85% of the variability of CDS β when this parameter is assumed constant for each company). Greater volatility would specifically mean a lower β , something habitually forecast by the structural models with an endogenous default barrier. One fundamental problem when using this variable as a regressor is that, to date, the volatility available to us is that which arises from the process of calibration of the ( )
Since we seek to omit any reference to the CDS market, we should consider an alternative measure of volatility for each company.
One option is to estimate ( ) i σ applying the algorithm described in Section 3, but setting the value of β irrespective of the data on CDS. Specifically, we can estimate the volatility that would arise from assuming that at each point in time t the shareholders choose the value of β optimally. We shall denote this value as
will take daily values instead of annual ones. The Appendix demonstrates how this optimal default point indicator for shareholders will be given for each t by the following expression: : as a measure of the risk-free rate we will use the year-long average of the swap rate at 5 years. The effect that this variable may have on the default point is ambiguous.
On one hand, as the interest rate increases the value of the current debt diminishes, which increases the incentives to repay it (lower β ). On the other, if this increase persists, it will in the long-term entail a higher financing cost, which may more readily dissuade the company from adhering to compliance with its commitments to creditors (higher β ). Situations involving higher interest rates may at the same time increases the influence of liquidity variables, which tends to complicate even further the prediction on the net effect 16 . to withstand lower values for their assets without defaulting on debt payment. Our hypothesis will therefore have it that there is an inverse relationship between leverage and CDS β . Table VII gives the results of an initial estimation (REG 1) in which volatility is included as the sole explanatory variable. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1%. This variable, though not reflecting intra-company variability, explains on its own more than 40% of the variability in the logarithm of CDS β , which confirms its importance as a determinant of the default point.
The The third column of Table VII contains It is not possible, moreover, to reject the null hypothesis that this latter coefficient is equal to 1 (t-statistic equal to -0.5180). The significance of the constant indicates, however, that the theoretical optimal default point tends on average to underestimate the true value by around 10%.
The correlation between volatility and END Lβ (Table VI) is -0.94, which suggests that this variable is the key element in the determination of But this does not appear to be the case. The adjusted R2 falls from 41% to 34% on moving from REG 1 to REG 3.
The results of the following estimation (REG 4), in which the logarithm of END β has been added as an explanatory variable to the variables included in REG 2, are included in the fourth column of Table VII . Despite the high correlation between volatility and END Lβ , the coefficients of both variables are significant and with the expected sign, indicating that their individual effects are accurately captured and that there are no relevant problems of multicollinearity. The adjusted R2 increases slightly relative to REG 2 (0.5%), which likewise supports the idea that both variables contain complementary information on CDS Lβ . Also of note is the fact that, relative to REG 2, size in its linear term and the quick ratio cease to be significant, with the remaining variables retaining their significance.
The question arises, once the rest of the variables are included, as to whether volatility continues to be more significant than END β for explaining the CDS β . Column 5
in Table VII repeats the second regression, but omitting volatility and including END Lβ .
The adjusted R2 falls from 83% to 65%, indicating that in this case volatility continues to have greater explanatory power than END Lβ .
In order to obtain a final model for the estimation of the default point indicator in theabsence of information on CDS, we perform a final estimation (REG 6). For this we take REG 4 as a basis, and sequentially eliminate those variables that show least significance.
The process ends when the coefficient of all the variables that remain in the model is significant at 10%. One interesting figure is that this process leads the payout coefficient, in its quadratic term, to become negative and for the first time significant, which confirms the inverse relationship that had been expected. The negative relationship between leverage and CDS β continues to be confirmed in this regression for any possible value of this variable.
Regarding the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio, the negative relationship that was previously conditional upon a value for this ratio below 1.7 is associated now with a value below 1.78, which is observed in our sample for approximately 90% of the observations.
Finally, the negative effect of size is now verified irrespective of the value this variable takes.
The final adjusted R2 is around 84%.
An important consideration is that though we have treated the and with the expected sign in the overall regression, with the elimination of either of them (REG 2 y REG 5) giving rise to a reduction in the adjusted R2. It therefore appears that in this case too they offer complementary information on the default point indicator.
variables that remained in the final regression by OLS, such variables also remain in the panel regression with random effects, and with an identical sign. The coefficients of leverage in its linear and quadratic term are, as before, consistent with a negative relationship to CDS β for any possible value of this variable. The negative relationship between the market-to-book ratio and CDS β , and which in the OLS regression was ultimately conditional upon a value for this ratio of less than 1.78, now holds for market-to-book ratio values of below 1.95, which in our sample holds in approximately 95% of the observations. The adjusted R2 of REG 6 for the panel estimation with random effects is 95%. Usefulness of the Econometric Model
A. Out-of-sample estimation of β
A key question is whether the econometric model obtained is applicable to out-of-sample companies, since that would allow the credit risk premium in the equity markets to be estimated, even in the absence of information on CDS. In this respect, we should ask whether, with a view to an out-of-sample estimation, the panel model with random effects -in which part of the individual variability may be explained randomly-is advisable, or whether on the contrary the cross-section model is preferable, where it is sought to include all the individual heterogeneity via the explanatory variables.
In order to test which procedure is preferable, we begin with an out-of-sample estimates of the ( ) T , i β based on the cross-section econometric model. To do this we randomly divide the sample into six groups with 16 companies each. We then re-estimate the REG 6 model, eliminating the companies from the first group, and we apply the results to predict the ( ) These results would support the idea that, with a view to an out-of-sample estimate, the cross-section model is preferable. ICS ), would be in line with the average values obtained 17. See Crouhy et al. (2000) . It is worth specifying that this exercise in no case seeks to replicate the type of results produced by the Moody's-KMV methodology.
B. Estimation of ICS without information on CDS
by Leland (2004) ICS ), which is equivalent to assuming that default arises when the value of the assets falls to the face value of the debt. Table X shows the differentials with respect to the CDS series in terms of the procedure selected to set the value of β . The main conclusions would be as follows:
The

REG ICS
tend to overestimate the CDS (by 41.05% on average) to a greater extent than the CDS ICS (7.93%). This is despite the fact that the differential between REG β and CDS β is on average equal to zero. These results stem from the non-linear relationship between the premium estimated in the equity market and β . Specifically, an overestimation of β appears to produce a bigger error in absolute values than the error generated by an underestimation of β on the same scale. The presence of positive extreme values in the differential between the REG ICS series and the CDS series implies, moreover, that the average is of such differences is far above the medians, and that the standard deviation is also very high. β , underestimations are made to a greater extent, giving rise on average to lower error.
6. Considering that the company defaults when the value of its assets falls below the face value of the debt ( 00 1.
β ) ultimately means a clear tendency to overestimation of the CDS.
The high penalisation in terms of error associated with the overestimation β means that, among all the procedures, this is the one which gives the worst results.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the econometric model is capable of reflecting much of the variability of β (up to 84% within the sample). The high sensitivity of the ICS to the value assumed for β , and the special penalisation associated with an error of overestimation of this parameter mean that, although in median terms the REG β produce better results, on average greater errors may be committed than with other methods. The prediction of the exact value of the credit risk premium generated from the model should thus be viewed with caution, and its use may be more appropriate for establishing credit risk ranges than for a strict valuation. This is what β for the range >500.
We thus see how those procedures that tend to underestimate the premiums are correct to a greater extent in respect of the range that concentrates a bigger percentage of observations. Expressed otherwise, as most of the CDS represent values below 100 bp, the procedures that systematically predicted low premiums ( END β and 75 0.
β ) tend to be correct to a greater extent than the procedure of applying REG β , since the latter seeks to distinguish between companies with low premiums and companies with high premiums.
In order to assess more formally the discriminatory capacity of each method, the following null hypothesis may be considered:
The value of 150 bp would be in the interval between 87.9 bp and 269.5 bp that Houweling and Vorst (2001) find on average for companies rated BBB and BB, respectively.
The interpretation of the null hypothesis might thus be that the company retains the investment rating according to the CDS market agents. in terms of the method applied for determining β . In the case of the direct estimation with CDS ( CDS β ), the probability of eI is 4% and that of eII is 14%. These values rise to 9% and 31%, respectively, on applying the econometric model ( REG β ). While the underestimation of premiums associated with the use of END β , 75 0. β and even KMV β holds the probability of eI below 5%, the probability of eII is in all cases above 65%, which indicates scant testing power. The opposite case would be that of 00 1.
β . On overestimating the premiums, the probability of eII falls to 9%, but significance worsens considerably (the probability of eI climbs to 42%). Mid-way between the results of applying β , with a level of significance of 12% and a probability of eII of 51%. This is possibly the case where the usefulness of REG β is most evident, since both types of errors lessen on applying a method that takes into account not only the average of β (0.85), but also the variability around that average. In sum, of all the procedures that do not require direct observation of the CDS, the use of REG β is that which, maintaining a level of significance below 10%, entails greater testing power. This power would specifically be twice that associated with the best possible alternative END β (69% as opposed to 35%).
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered a broad sample of US, European and Japanese companies during the period 2001-2004, calibrating the default barrier for each company-year on the basis of their CDS premia. Although the procedure used has broadly been that described by Forte and Peña (2006) , two fundamental contributions should be highlighted. Firstly, we calibrated not only the default point, but also bankruptcy costs (exogenous in the original model). To do this we adjusted the mean recovery rate forecast for each sector to its historical average. Secondly, we constructed an econometric model which allows the default point indicators to be estimated without resorting to information on the CDS market.
The model, which explains up to 84% of the variability of the default point indicators within the sample, uses only information on the equity market and a small number of accounting items.
The main advantage is thus its potential application to companies for which no data on CDS are available. Compared with other alternatives for setting the default point when this information cannot be had (the optimal default point for shareholders, the default point in the 18. See Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) . 
